Making regulation is the primary function of the modern state. Current praxis shows how there is positive and negative cooperation among policy participant in the process of local legislation.
INTRODUCTION
bureaucracy, and the legislative at the local level. In the same time, as reported by Ministry of Home Affairs, 313 local head were arrested as bribery suspects during 2004 -2017 periods in several sectors such as local budgeting, local tax, public procurement, social grant, official travel, and licensing. Private sector and the local legislature are also participating in this practice. In this case, there is contrary cooperation between the executive, the bureaucracy, the legislature, and the private sector. The question is how to understand the -cooperation‖ between the policy participant during the formulation of the local legislation? Theoretically, regulation is one of the attributes of a modern state. It has functions, for example, to redistribute income and wealth, 2 reducing monopoly of power and the elimination of specific forms of price discrimination, 3 and correcting market failure. 4 The scholars have different perspectives in understanding -the cooperation‖ between the players in the formulation of regulation. The economic theory of regulation, for example, assuming that the primary function of regulation is transferring wealth through a political market. This market has been influenced by the demand side (the constituents) and the supply side (the political representatives). 5 For the economic theory of regulation, cooperation among actors in the legislative process is the effect of supply-demand interaction.
The second point of view is the public choice theory, a variant of the economic theory of regulation. In the simple form, as suggested by Tollison 6 , legislation process could be formulated as follows: L = f (POP, INC, ASSOC, SIZE, RATIO, MAJ), where L = legislation process; POP = population; INC = real income; ASSOC = the number of trade association; SIZE = legislative size; RATIO = the ratio of the size of the House to the size of the Senate; and MAJ = the size of legislative majority. The public choice theory is also concerned on the effect of political player (i.e., politicians, bureaucrat, interest group, private corporation, mass media, and so on) behaviour on the legislative process. They introduced several important concepts to understanding legislation process such us rent-seeking behaviour, climber bureaucrat, bureaucratic politics, and budget maximiser, 7 optimum destructive regulation. 8 For public choice theory, cooperation between actors in the legislative process is the product of bar-gaining among 5 rational actors who attempt to maximizing self-interest. The third perspective is agency theory who see legislation process as the principalagent relationship. For agency theory, regulation is an instrument for the regulators (principal) to control or influence the activity or the available choice of the regulated (agent). Both the principal and the agent have constraints and problems in this relationship. The agent face problems to recognize the principal preferences, acquire knowledge of what acts will be compatible with those preferences, obtain knowledge of how to perform those acts. The principal has problems in transmitting their preferences to agents, educating agents or indicating what acts would service those preferences, monitoring the agent's performance, and preventing and correcting any deviation by the agent from desired performance levels.
9 For agency theory, cooperation between the players in legislation process is the problem of principal-agency relationship.
The sixth is discourse analysis approach which defines regulations as -a process involving the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to identified purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering, and behaviour modification." For this approach, the legislation process is "the communicative interactions that occur between all involved in the regulatory ‗space' (regulatory process).‖ It is also contestation for the meaning and the relationships of 9 Barry M. Mitnick. (1982) Regulation and the Theory of Agency. Review of Policy Research.
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10 For this approach, cooperation among actors in the legislation process is the struggle of power through meaning, identities, thought, and knowledge. However, all the theories on the above do not explain the influence of the belief system to cooperation between actors in the legislation process. In the same time, many Indonesian scholars are also ignoring the belief system in their empirical research on the legislation process. ization and, thus, very difficult to change. The next element of belief system is PCB which consists of the priority of different policy-related values, the relative authority of government and markets, the proper roles of policy participants, the relative seriousness and causes of policy problems. Because PCB is subsystem-wide in scope and deals with fundamental policy choices, they are also very difficult to change. The final layer of the belief system consists of SPB. SPB is relatively narrow in scope, for example, detailed rules and budgetary applications within a specific program, the seriousness and causes of problems in a specific locale, and public participation guidelines within a specific statute. Because SPB is narrower in scope than PCB, changing them requires less evidence and fewer agreements among subsystem actors and thus should be less difficult.
18
All policy participants, based on the similarity of their PCB to another actor, make or join an advocacy coalition. ACF used ‗advocacy coalition' terminology to explain a set of an actor from multiple levels of government who cooperate each other in a long period based on the non-trivial manner to influence public policymaking process.
19 Each advocacy coalition has resources such as formal legal authority to make decisions, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources, and The regional economy of SSP is dominated by three sectors: mining, manufacturing industry, and agriculture (including forestry and fishery). In 2016, these sectors have a significance contribute to Regional Gross Domestic Product (GRDP) as follows mining (19.89 percent), manufacturing industry (18.86), and agriculture (16.06 percent). In 2016, growth occurs in all business fields. However, the highest growth was in the electricity and gas procurement sector (17.32 percent), financial services and insurance (7.33 percent) and other services (6.50 percent). When viewed from the creation of sources of economic growth, the processing industry has the highest growth (1.15 percent), followed by construction (0.97 percent), and large/retail trade and motorcycle repair (0.84 percent).
28
Currently, SSP consists of 17 districts, 232 sub-districts, 2,859 villages, and 377 kelurahan (the village in the urban area) (South Sumatera Central Agency on Statistics, 2017 Kota Palembang) . This research does not find the element of civil society who propose a new local regulation on forest fires mitigation to remedy this problem. It is mean that creating a new local regulation on forest fires mitigation is not a bottom-up agenda, but a top-down agenda.
As the initiator of a new local regulation on forest fires mitigation, the executive task force should prepare an academic manuscript. The Government of South Sumatra Province make several events to finalize academic manuscript on forest fires mitigation such as public discussion, technical meeting, comparative study, and public assessment (TK, a senior civil servant in the Agency of Forestry, South Sumatera Province, interview, 17 May 2017 Palembang City stated that this local regulation is created suddenly without participation from environmental NGO activist in South Sumatera. 35 The Governor of SSP submitted the final version of the academic manuscript to the Regional Legislation Program of the South Sumatera Province of The Regional House of Representative. The Chief of the South Sumatera Province of the Regional House of Representative creates a special committee to discuss the academic manuscript with the executive's task force. The member of the special committee is recruited from all political party in the South Sumatera Province of the Regional House of Representative. The Chief of the South Sumatera Province of the Regional House of Representative is only given one month for the special committee and the executive task force to discuss and finalize legal draft on forest fires mitigation. The Chief of the South Sumatera Province of the Regional House of Representative will approve or reject the legal draft on forest fires mitigation in SSP based the recommendation of the special committee. On the other words, the special committee should be applying a critical thinking towards the legal draft proposed by the executive task force.
The essence of the alternative selection is how to accept, reject, or revise the argumentation of the executive's ideas behind the legal draft using multiple approaches (i.e., legal, political, economic, 35 Wijaya, Taufik. (2016) Actor Policy Belief ACF theorist argues that each policy actor has policy belief which consists of three layers: deep core belief (DCB), policy core belief (PCB), and secondary policy belief (SPB). This research will focus on secondary policy belief because of it very dynamics than DCB and PCB. We apply an ‗environmental narrative' to construct SCB's actors. Shortly, an environmental narrative is policy actor perception on forest fires which consists of three elements: the cause, the solution, and the impact. We use NVIVO 11 software to coding data from the interview, social media, newspaper, website, and the official publication of government, plantation corporation, and non-governmental organization. This process provides the SCB's narrative that represents the logic of causality (cause -impact -solution) all actor on forest fires implicitly (see Table 1 ). Table 1 shows the similarities and differences of actors' perceptions of the causes, impacts, and solutions of forest fires explicitly. At the causes dimension, all policy actor agrees that the natural and the human factors contribute to the forest fires. All policy actor believes that the forest fires have significant effects on human beings [44] (i.e., economy, politics, and social) and ecology. However, all policy actors have a different opinion on ‗no burning policy' in The Provincial Regulation of South Sumatera No. 8 of 2016 on the Forest Fires Mitigation. As shown in Table 1 , three actors (The Government of South Sumatera Province, The South Sumatera Province of the Regional House of Representative, and plantation corporation) agree to prohibit this practice at small farmer and corporation level. Other actors, environmental NGO, and scientist agreed to forbid this practice at corporation level only but authorized it at small farmer level. Based on this finding, this research argues that the SCB's policy actor during the formulation of The Provincial Regulation of South Sumatera No. 8 of 2016 on the Forest Fires Mitigation follows two patterns: partially different or the same overall. This finding becomes our empirical basis to analyse the formation of the advocacy coalition during the formulation of The Provincial Regulation of South Sumatera No. 8 of 2016 on the Forest Fires Mitigation. The Advocacy Coalition For ACF theorist, advocacy coalition is a set of policy participant who makes cooperation based their similarities on policy belief to influence the policymaking process. In our case, the basis for this similarity is policy participant attitudes towards ‗no burning policy' and ‗slash-and-burn' agriculture. Based on the previous findings, this research identifies two advocacy coalition during the formulation of The Provincial Regulation of South Sumatera No. 8 of 2016 on the Forest Fires Mitigation. First, ‗no burning policy' coalition which possesses three members (The Government of South Sumatera Province, The South Sumatera Province of the Regional House of Representative, and plantation corporation). Second, ‗local wisdom' coalition which owns two members (environmental NGO and scientist).
ACF predicts that each advocacy coalition will influence the policymaking process. Each member of the advocacy coalition will share resources and formulate the best strategy to articulate their policy preferences. When there is a conflict between two or more advocacy coalition, ‗the policy broker' will mediate to resolve this conflict based on win-win solutions. Unfortunately, our finding does not support this prediction overall. First, although the plantation corporation has similar SCB with the executive and the legislative, they still cannot fully participate in legislation process due to closed-door of participation window. Second, ‗no burning policy' coalition make legis-lation process as a restricted area and do not permit ‗local wisdom' coalition to fully participate and articulate their policy preferences. Third, this research does not find policy participants which playing the role as the ‗policy broker'. This research predict that the central government and the judiciary institution will play this role through ‗the executive review' and ‗the judicial review' mechanism. However, this research does not find this mechanism resolve ‗no burning policy' issue between ‗local wisdom' coalition and ‗no burning policy' coalition. However, this research agrees that there are resources sharing (i.e., information) among advocacy coalition member. Because they have a limited role in the legislation process, ‗local wisdom' coalition choose to influence the policy making process through the media (newspaper, magazine, broadcasting, and social media).
